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Some nations have given up the whole commerce of their colonies 
to an exclusive company ... Of all the expedients that can well 
be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a new colony, that 
of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effectual. (l)
Introductory R ote '
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations .-
While Adam Smith's indictment on his contemporary monopolies, which operated
during the era of merchant capital dominance, has a lot of validity in it, it
cannot be properly applied to the British South Africa Company (BSA Co) without » e
very important qualifications which, in the case cf Rhodesian white settlers,
largely invalidate the indictment. The strictures of this great prophet of
capitalism and defender of free trade against his comtemporary monopolies, and
quoted above only in brief, however, do to some extent apply to much of the
history of BSA Co rule in Northern Rhodesia, which the Chartered Company for a
long time viewed as a labour reservoir for its more prized territory of Southern
Rhodesia. Smith's strictures apply even more to the Chartered Company's . • o
contemporary monopolies, such as the Mozambique and Nyasa Companies in Portuguese
East Africa, flj&-fcher of which could be said to have developed the Mozambican
economy in any meaningful way. ' (2) The reasons for both Britain and Portugal f
resorting or agreeing to d^ he expediency of chartered company colonization lie , ;
heytnd the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the primary reason was
to finance, imperialism pn the cheap during the scramble for Africa in the late
19th century.
2Although settler agriculture in Southern Rhodesia has been touched upon by 
historians such as Gann, Murray and Palmer (3), none of their works address 
themselves specifically to the development of settler agriculture. This paper 
focuses on the activities of the BSA Co as the power behind the Colonial State 
in the field of agricultural development and-on the development of the Company's 
own agricultural enterprises, run by its Commercial Branch. It will be argued • 
that, in general, far from stunting the development of Southern Rhodesia, the 
Company instituted measures directed to facilitate economic development under 
settler and Company hegemony. (The focus is on the policies under which white 
agriculture developed.) However, it will also be demonstrated that Company and 
settler interests were not always identical, and that the period of Company 
rule was characterised by a struggle between Company and settler interests, on 
the one hand, and between white and black interests, on the other, and that in 
the latter case the Company nearly always supported settler interests.
Prom the outset of Occupation in IB9O, African rights to land were written off 
and the land was regarded as the Company's commercial asset, to be sold to white 
settlers on easy terms (4). Thus the policy of using settlers as the main 
agent for development and the Company's fiscal and labour policies are central 
to a coherent understanding of the development of settler agriculture in Southern 
Rhodesia, as I try to demonstrate below.
Between Occupation and aboutl905, the Company's efforts were directed at 
realizing a "Second Rand" in Southern Rhodesia, so much so that for the first 
two and a half decades after Occupation the mines were largely dependent on 
African producers for food supplies (5). As early as 1891 the Company's 
directors had stated that "splendid as are the agricultural prospects of the 
country, it is to the mineral wealth that the Directors look for the most 
profitable returns" (6). However, by 1912 the Directors were telling share­
holders that:
"The recent pronounced and continuous rise in land values, 
both in S. and N. Rhodesia, is, in the view of the Board 
the most striking feature of the present situation. In 
the early years of the territory the mining industry was; 
the Company's chief care. While this industry continues 
to receive such assistance as its circumstances require, 
land is today claiming a much greater share of the 
Company's attention, and the industries, connected with 
it are rapidly gaining ground that capital is available 
for their support." (7)
At this time the Company started to build bacon factories, creameries and, not - 
long afterwards, oil and soap factories, to provide markets for settler 
agriculture and thereby stimulate pig and dairy farming. Such agricultural 
industries would not only help to lower,the cost of living at the mines but 
also provide the country with export commodities in time.
The myth of a "Second Rand" which had survivied the first war of Chimurenga 
(liberation) in 3896-7, and the rail link crisis caused by the Anglo-Boer War 
of 1899-1901, finally ended with the financial crisis of 1903-4 (8). The post- 
1908 period up to the beginning of World V/ar 1 has been depicted by Palmer as 
the phase of the "white agricultural policy" (9), different from the period - 
prior to it in that it marked the time during which the SSA Co systematically 
implemented its new policy of promoting settler farming, settlement and 
agrarian production. The burial of the "Second Rand" myth thus gave settler
5agriculture a tremendous boost as the Company began to focus its attention 
on agricultural development and the realization of "its" land asset.
But before examining the development of capitalist agriculture during the era 
of Company rule, it is worth noting the following two points. Capitalism 
developed in Rhodesian agriculture in t-wo ways. First, by internal accumulation 
of surplus value. White farmers (and also some black farmers) sought to build 
up resources of capital from profits. White farmers had an advantage, in that 
there were a large number of resources at their disposal (taxes, compulsory 
labour, pass laws, private locations, etc.) by which they could extract surplus 
value frbm Africans, who increasingly turned into a local rural proletariat.
(The contribution of such compulsory measures, to capitalist agricultural 
development in Southern'Rhodesia has been insufficiently recognized in the 
published literature.) At the same time a large corpus of legislation and 
practice grew up to ensure that African producers did not become capitalist 
farmers competing with settler farmers. The CMC, Herbert Taylor, was reflecting 
government policy when he stated in 1918; "The native should be trained not so 
much as. a competitor with the white man in the business, of life, but as a useful 
auxiliary to help in the progress of the country." (lO). It must be pointed 
out that the estates and ranches set up by the BSA Co's Commercial Branch from 
about 1910 onwards also benefit ed from the above repressive measures. The . 
white-farmers have had in this struggle the inestimable advantage of political 
power, both during and after Company rule. Through settler agitation, the 
number of elected members in the Legislative Council rose from 4 (against 7 
Company representatives) to 7(out of 15) in 1903, and stood at 7 (out of 13) 
between 1908 and 1913- In 1914 elected members held 12 of the 20 seats in the 
Council (ll). But the influence of settler representatives on government 
policy, especially with regard to labour policies and the yearly estimates, is 
not to be looked at merely in tferms of the number of elected members Vis-a-vis 
nominated members, since it was in the political interest of the Company to. 
carry as much settler support with it as. possible.
Secondly, the penetration of international capital is a major factor in the 
development of capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia. International 
I capital was present in Southern Rhodesia in terms of speculative financial
■  investment r i g h t  f r o m  t h e  1890' s ,  i n  t h e  fo r m  o f  b i g  l a n d  g r a n t s  ( l 2) .  The
I BSA Co Manager noted in 1912 that the fifteen principal land-owning companies 
I in Southern Rhodesia held over 8 million acres between theji, with Amalgamated
■ Properties of Rhodesia and Willoughby's Consolidated Co Ltd owning 1,544,000
■ acres and 1,339*000 acres, respectively. The fact that over 6 million acres of
■ the above land lay within 25 miles of the railway lines gave this land an
■ added importance and value. (13) It is important to note, of course, that the
■ ISA Co, as the largest land owner in the country, had a direct role here through 
I its Commercial Branch, which ran large estates and ranches. Throughout most
lof the period of Company rule these big land companies, many of which were
■  owned by mining capital, held their land largely for speculative purposes. And 
liber, they did go in for farming they tended to limit themselves to the country's
■ three major agricultural commodities, viz. maize, tobacco and, above all,
I cattle ranching (which required minimal infrastructure on the farm and had'an
■ ssaured market at the local mines and, from February 1916, on the Rand), (l4)
I There was hostility between settler farmers and the land speculators right
1 from the 1890's, the former accusing the latter of "locking up" valuable 
Iapicijltural land and African labour, and thereby hindering white immigration.
■ Ms hostility was manifested particularly in the tussels over the Private 
lkcations Ordinance (1908). One result of the promulgation of the above
4Ordinance wa,s that from about 1910 the State could take action against purely 
speculative interests in land and international capital was forced to become 
productive (to a limited extent). It was partly this move by the State at the 
hehest of settler farmers, and the gradual eradication of East Coast Fever and 
other cattle diseases, that gave a spur to large-scale ranching in the period 
prior to the 1921-22 cattle market crisis (15).
Capitalist Agriculture Boosted.
B etween 1906 and 1912 six major factors together boosted capitalist 
agriculture, so much so that by the close of the second decade cf the 20th 
century settler agriculture had reached a level of self-sufficiency, especially 
in three of the country's major agricultural commodities, viz. maize, tobacco 
and cattle, hnd, after cornering the domestic market for itself, especially 
food supplies to the mines hitherto dominated by African producers, had begun 
to penetrate external markets in the sub-continent, and even overseas in the 
case of maize, tobacco and citrus fruits. The six factos are the Wise Report 
of 1906, the 1907 visit to Southern Rhodesia by a committee of the BSA Co Board 
of Directors, headed .by Henry Birchenough, the reorganization of the Agricultural 
Department under the directorship of Dr. Eric Nobhs in 1908, the promulgation 
of the Private Locations Ordinance (PLO) in 1908. the Company's embarkation on 
a policy of developing its own estates and ranches "on strictly commercial lines 
for profit", and the establishment of the Land Bank in 1912. These factors are 
now discussed in turn.
C.D. Wise, an experienced British agriculturalist and the Company's land 
settlement expert, left the UK for Southern Rhodesia in October 1905, with 
instructions from the Board "to report generally upon the current and future 
prospects of the agricultural industry, the opportunities for new settlers, and 
the methods by which cultivating owners could be best established upon the soil" 
(l6). In the same year, at the instructions of the Board, the administration in 
Southern Rhodesia passed a Loans Ordinance providing for the constitution of a 
(Public Debt of £250,000 "to be expended upon agricultutal holdings". Although 
rejected by the Colonial Office, the Ordinance nevertheless, indicates the 
Company's new aggressive agricultural policy. (17)
The Directors were impressed by Wise's report and asked him to return to 
Southern Rhodesia to start operations and prepare a Central Farm on one of tho 
areas selected for settlement, "for the purpose of receiving”’and training 
settlers" in general, in accordance with the methods submitted in his report. 
The Directors expounded a bold settlement policy to their shareholders: "It 
will be the Company's aim to assist settlers to take up farms already prepared 
for their occupation, by the support and facilities offered them, rather than 
by giving them raw land at prairie value" (l8), although the Company would not 
suspend the sale of unimproved land outside the settled areas- for settlement. 
Each district taken up for settlement was to have an experimental farm financed 
by a special grant from the Administration to assist experimental work, such as 
trials and selection of seeds and trials of insecticides, tinder the auspices of 
the Agricultural Department. The Department would disseminate the experimental 
results dm the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, and invite farmers to inspect the 
trial grounds. As Wise himself had noted, "A great advantage in carrying out 
such trials on the Central Farm is that the farms will be in different parts of 
the country, and experiements will therefore be more valuable, being carried 
out under local conditions of that particular district" (19). The earliest 
Central Farms/Experimental Farms were established on the Salisbury Commonage, 
at the Company's Mazoe and Premier estates and Marandellas farm. (20)
5Assistance to new settlers would include, inter alia, assisted sea passage and 
free rail passage to Southern Rhodesia, temporary accommodation and opportunities 
for practical experience, and a proportion of land to he cultivated before the 
arrival of the settler and assistance in providing stock. The Directors also 
took up Wise's recommendation to urge co-operation among settler farmers for the 
purchase and sale of agricultural materials and produce, and the construction 
of better roads to connect farming districts such as Melsetter, Enkeldoorn and 
Victoria to railway lines, "to enable them to go ahead". But perhaps the most 
imp ortant of Wise's recommendations adopted by the Company was that the 
Company should "dispose of their land to the first settlers at a low but fair 
rate, according to the market value of the land in the country today, reserving , 
however, alternate blocks /to be sold later when prices had risen/* they should 
assist these men as far as possible in reason, without spoonfeeding, and make 
them successful, as their success- will mean the success of land settlement and 
the development of the country". In the next few years the Company resorted to 
the simple expedient of reducing the minimum price of land to l/6 a morgen (2l). 
But commercial companies are not renowned for their benevolence and the lowering 
of land prices, was simply a practical move by the Board to attract settlers and 
was not designed to last for very long. As the Directors enthusiastically 
reported to shareholders in 1913* "The average price at which land was sold by 
the Company in Southern Rhodesia during the six months ended 31st September 
last /I912/ represented an advance of 26/ on the average of the preceding year, 
and 53/ on the corresponding figure for the year ended 31st March 1910." (22)
“he declaration of policy issued to settlers at Bulawayo in October 1907 by the 
isiting Commission of Directors further confirmed the Company's adoption of 
ise's recommendations. The Commission stated that the Company intended to 
ursue an active and forward commercial policy, and to stimulate in every 
lossible way the opening up and steady development of the mineral and 
.gricultural resources of the country (23). As the Directors told shareholders., 
he time had arrived for the adoption of a vigorous policy of development upon 
iroad lines and the Company would incur expenditure in all the above 
lirections 1
The return for expenditure so incurred is to be looked 
for, not only in direct profits, but also in the natural 
development resulting from an increase of population, 
which will bring about the occupation and settlement of 
vast areas; now lying idle, increase in the productive 
power of Rhodesia, improvement in railway traffics and 
enhancement of the value of the Company's land. (24)
(emphasis mine)
In order to encourage further land settlement, the visiting Commission 
proposed (a) as noted above, to reduce the price of land, (b) to accept cash 
payments for land where there was a reasonable guarantee- of genuine occupation 
and (c) submitted proposals to the Chamber of Mines and Farmers' Associations, 
aimed at amending the Mines and Minerals Ordinance to restrict and define the 
privileges of prospectors and miners on occupied farms. Point (c) had regard 
to (i) access to grazing rights after mining operations had begun, (ii) cutting 
timber and (iii) the use of water. Further, the Company undertook to pay 
rebates on the purchase price of farms where improvements had been carried out, 
in the form of fencing, tree planting and general cultivation. In order to 
joarry out the Company's new policy, the Directors proposed the immediate 
issuing of 3 million new shares.
The reorganization of the Agricultural Department in 1908 by Dr. Eric Nobbs,
6an agricultural scientist from the Cape, who served aa Director of Agriculture 
between 1908 and 1925? revolutionized the functions of the Department, thus 
giving a boost to capitalist agriculture. The reorganization was planned to 
increase the Department's administrative efficiency as well as its scientific 
activities. From this period on, the Department consistently increased ita 
number of agriculturalists, tobacco and cotton experts, veterinary officers, 
agricultural scientists, .etc. In addition to conducting experiments and: 
disseminating the results to farmers, these experts went out to farms regularly 
to give on-the-spot advice to settler farmers. Dr. Hobbs regarded such visits 
as.-.'the most effective method of getting progressive ideas, across to farmers in 
a new country-"with a population so largely composed of newcomers, many of them 
without any agricultural experience ..." (2.5) Such free state provision of 
scientific and technical services to settler farmers must be regarded as an 
important form of capital made available to capitalist agriculture.
The Private Locations Ordinance (FLO) (26), which was modelled on the Cape 
legislation, had its roots in the demand of the ^atabeleland branch of the 
Rhodesia Land owners' and Farmers' Association to the visiting BSA Co Directors 
in 1907 that legeslation be enacted on the lines recommended by the South 
African Dative Affairs Commission (1905-5)? to restrict African occupation of 
white-owned land. The Ordinance limited the number of African adult males on 
a 1,500 morgen farm to 40, and stipulated the number of months' work the tenant 
had to work for his landlord at current rates of wages. Thus the distribution 
of African farm labour was not left to the operation of "market forces", but 
was actually legislated for by the State to benefit white agriculture. As the 
Rhodesda Herald reported, Attorney General Tredgold's speech in the 
Legislative Council declared:
There were two ideas which must be prominent in all such 
legislation: one was that the occupier of land, farm owner 
or any other person whom it raay be, should not be deprived 
of a reasonable quantity of labour for the carrying out of 
such work as he was doing. The other extreme was that the 
owner should not congregate upon his land so many natives 
that the land could not support them, and they thereby 
become a great nuisance to neighbours, by living and preying 
on the surrounding country. (27)
It hardly needs to be said that Tredgold's second reason for the Ordinance was 
largely an ideological justification for the first. As Tredgold himself 
stated, he was in total agreement with the conclusion of the South African 
Native Affairs Commission that the system of allowing large numbers of Africans, 
on white-owned land and "Kaffir farming" "restricts the supply of labour; that 
it fills up with natives much land which would otherwise be better utilized- 
and developed, and it leads to the absence of due control over them" (28).
The PLO attacked "Kaffir farmers", i.e. those rentier landlords and share- 
cropping interests who were extracting capital from Africans living on their 
land in the form of money, rents and agricultural produce, by charging Is. and 
5s. annually per contract for bona fide farmers actually occupying the land and 
absentee landlords, respectively (29). The above section of the PLO was 
bitterly opposed (without success) by land-owning interests in the Chamber of 
Mines, who argued that if it was a question of revenue, as it appeared to them, 
"it would be better to raise such revenue by the direct taxation of the natives; 
rather than by throv/ing on the large landowners the odium of increased taxation 
and disturbance of rights".(50) Settler demands for the PLO and the opposition
7to it by rentier and share-cropping interests must be viewed in the light of 
the penetration of finance capital into land. Such penetration led to the 
accumulation of large estates for speculative purposes, and hence also to the f 
rise of rent-tenancy and share-cropping and the hostility of the more 
commercialized settler farmers to both casual labour -tenancy agreements and to 
rentier landlords for "locking up" land and African labour. In some areas the 
PLO merely legalized a practice that had been gaining ground for some time. As. 
the CNC, Matabeleland, reported in 1907? "Agreements between owners of farms, and 
natives occupying them are becoming more general, but, in many instances, natives; 
prefer moving to the Reserves to binding themselves to any definite contract".(31)
It must be pointed out, however, that the less capitalized farmers neither 
initiated nor accepted the PLO voluntarily, and, in fact, those in areas such as 
Melsetter fought a rear-guard battle against the PLO well after the promulgation 
of the Ordinance. Even among the more successful capitalist farmers, the effect 
of the PLO was merely to regulate labour tenancy, not to destroy it. The 
supreme advantage of the labour tenant system was that during this early 
development of the cash nexus, when the "effort price" of African participation 
in settler agriculture was too high, it offered capitalist agriculture the 
necessary coersive apparatus to regulate labour supply. By 1916, the CNC could 
report that the Ordinance had had a "good effect" on labour supply, as a whole,
|in that 1,100 locations had been established under Section 3 of the Ordinance (32).
Although the Company Government started giving out funds to settler farmers in 
the form of fencing loans as early as 1904; there was no proper institution 
for the first 22 year’s of Company rule to enable farmers to borrow money on 
easy terms, to employ in a wide range of agricultural activities. By 1907 
settler representatives in the Legislative Council were demanding that the 
Government establish a Land Bank, "to assist farmers with loans for purchasing 
stock, agricultural machinery, seeds and generally with a view to stimulating 
and encouraging the farming industry" (33)’ Partly as a result of settler 
pressure and partly out of the desire to attract new settlers]^co diversify the 
country's agricultural production and thereby indirectly profit from higher 
la nd prices and increased railway freight, the Company set up a Land Bank in 
1912, with a share capital cf £250,000. Approved applicants could get up to 
a maximum of £2,000 on first mortgage over landed property or on deposit of 
other approved security. (3 V^)
Repayment of capital was spread over a period of 10 years and the annual interest 
rate of G°/c was below Whatjcommercial banks were charging. The Land Bank's policy, 
like that of the much larger Land and Agriculture Bank, created by the new all­
settler government in 1924, was to make credit facilities "available for persons 
of European descent only." (35).
Direct BSA Go involvement in agricultural production started with the setting
up of Central Farms under the management of G.D. Wise at the end of 1906, at
Marendellas, and later at Sigeja»Ifazoe and Premier estates. By early 1912 the
Company was also operating Kooeaale Estate /in the hartley District/, which
consisted of 95,305 acres, forming part of 118,000 acres taken over in satisfaction /
of a debt of £4,698 owed by the French South African Development Company Ltd,
and had acquired other farms which were being farmed on a half-share agreement
with the Company (36). The latter farms included the Mazoe Citrus Farm (owned
by the Mazoe Syndicate), in which the Company had bought a one-third share
interest in 1909 and which the Company soon virtually owned.
Despite the financial, administrative and technical weaknesses of the early 
history of the Central Farms, in 1910. Iviarandellas and Premier Estate produced 
tobacco worth £2,000 and £800, respectively, and in 1911 P.S. Inskipp, the
8Commercial Representative, could state that the three farms at Sinoia, 
Marandellas and Premier Estate were self-supporting (37)* Additional tobacco 
plantations were being established on all three estates as the Company set out 
to promote tobacco culture in the country. Early in 1910, for example, the 
Tobacco'Company of Rhodesia and South Africa Ltd, itself a subsidiary of the 
BSA Co , was formed to take over the operations of the B3A Co in connection with 
the•purchase"and sale of Rhodesian tobacco, including the leases of the tobacco 
warehouses which the Chartered Company had built for the "scientific" handling 
of the country's tobacco output. The new company also acquired "the right to 
select a total of 30,000 acres of land suitable for tobacco cultivation" (38).
In 1910 the BSA Co became the first landowner in the country to develop citrus, 
culture on a commercial scale, first at the mazoe Estate %nd not long after­
wards at Premier and Sinoia Estates, and to a lesser exteht at the Marandellas 
farm. In January 1912, the six farms being worked wholly by the Company 
totalled 76,150 acres, 1,418 of which were under cultivation. In addition to 
the above, 6,118 acres at Sinoia and 73>941 acres at Rhodesdale were being used 
for grazing (39)• The Rhodesdale Estate, which was enlarged to over 1 million 
•acres, developed into one of the Company's important ranches during the second 
decade of the 20th century, and had on it 40,000 head of cattle by 1923 (40).
Prom about 1910 the Company's policy towards the Central Farms began to change 
from regarding them as mere training centres for settlers. As the Directors 
reported to the shareholders, "The primary object in the working of these 
estates is the earning of profits, but their use for secondary objects, such as 
the training of settlers, is not lost sight of" (4 1). While increased settler 
immigration would result in
increased land purchases and, therefore, increased profits for the Company, by 
improving the undeveloped land and showing that good profits could be made the 
Company could send up the price which it could later ask for the remaining so- 
called unalienated land (i.e. land which had been expropriated but not yet 
granted to individuals or companies by the BSA Co). The above view was 
reinforced by a 1912 memorandum by H. Wilson Fox, the Company's manager and 
financial expert (42). In a 1904 report commissioned by the Company, Lt-Col 
Owen Thomas stated that (at that time) the case for agriculture as a leading 
national industry of Southern Rhodesia could not be demonstrated to the serious 
agriculturist. "I frankly admit my failure to solve the problem of success in 
agriculture in Rhodesia, except as a minor adjunct of stock-farming; but I ... 
recognize the immense suitability of that country for the pastoral branch of 
husbandry." (43) Another expert employed by the Company, Professor Walla«e of 
Edinburgh University, a specialist on rural economics, reported in 1908 that,
"As a supplementary branch of rural industry on livestock farms there is much 
scope for agricultural extension, but as a primary means by which the country 
as. a whole may be developed, agriculture pure and simple is quite out of the 
question" (44)• The Director of Agriculture added weight to the above 
conclusions when he reported at the end of 1911 that Rhodesia was "essentially 
a stock country. The conditions of the country point strongly to meat as the 
principal, ultimate product to be elaborated off (sic) our veld ... Arable 
farming must rank below stock farming in importance, profitability and 
usefulness." (45)
Fox concluded from the above reports and others that, if land in Southern 
Rhodesia was to be valued according to the return which could, on average, be 
derived from it when employed for the purpose it was best adapted, "that value 
must primarily be determined vfith the reference to its value as a stock-raising 
country". Fox argued, and the Bond agreed, that land must be regarded as. the
9Company's principal asset, -t-<Mc-i.ng: fr-d<prity over the Company's two other major 
assets, minerals and railways, and was to he developed "with the object of 
making the maximum profit for its owners" (46)0 He argued that even at as 
low a figure as 5 s« per acre the Company's land assets, north and south of the 
Zambezi, amounted to over £20 million, "a sum higher than I can assign to the 
Company's mining and railway interests combined on the best assumptions that 
on present knowledge I feel justified in making Another Director, Lord 
Winchester, reinforced the above view when he stated in a memorandum the following 
year that the Chartered Company's Mines and Development Co had already spent 
£20,000 without any definite results. "If this £2C 100 had been expended in 
the improvement of, say, 10 farms, I think it would have made a better return, 
taking into consideration the value which each settler is to both the Customs 
and Railway receipts." (47)
Pox remindedhis fellow Directors that, "speaking politically", time was, running 
out for the Company and that it was a case of now or never. The Company could 
not prove or realize the tru^value of its estate by establishing a few highly 
developed estates, small in area, which no-one would accept as samples of the 
country at large, or by selling land on a large scale at low prices. The 
Company had already alienated 16 million acres in the most accessible districts 
"for practically nothing so far as cash return is concerned and yet this land 
remains in comparatively few hands, and the greater proportion of it is /
undeveloped". V48) ^n May 1911, only 2,140 whites were engaged in agricultural 
pursuits, and Pox gave a liberal estimate of 5>000 whites upon the land, out 
of a white population of 23,606. Between January 1908 and July 1912 the 
Company itself had settled 2,849 persons on 5 >210,549 acres. Clearly the 
Company's policy of closer settlement, designed to limit farm sizes and to raise 
‘the land prices, was not producing the anticipated results and had in fact 
aet with popular disfavour among settlers. Fox argued for a more comprehensive 
1 policy by which the value of the Company's vast land holdings of priarie land 
could be conclusively demonstrated, how was this to be done? "My answer",
Fox stated, "is by utilising itself large areas of average land for the purpose 
of which it is best suited, Viz, stock raising” (49) > which would have the 
secondary effect of taming land, especially outside the 25-mile railway zone, 
and therefore of raising its value when later taken up by new settlers. Pox 
recommended that £1 million be earmarked for expenditure on five ranches of
500,000 acres each , of which four were to he in Southern Rhodesia and one in 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The Central Farm at Rhodesdale was to he up­
graded into a ranch and the four ranches in Southern Rhodesia were to be 
developed in such a way as to be fully stocked by the end of 1920 (50).
In the memorandum of Junel913> Pox repeated his call for the vigorous
prosecution of the Company's ranching policy and listed four area's of policy. (51)
These were that the Company should (a) develop estates, e.g. citrus estates;
(h) develop irrigable land "on businesa lines, the object in each case to make 
a profit on the sale of improved land"; (c) that the above estates should 
provide young European settlers with the opportunity of working for wages, 
before launching out on their own account as tenants or proprietors - a system 
that had already been tried in tobacco growing my Major Prank Johnson at the 
Inyoka Estate in present-day Gokwe district. But there would be "no room for 
tradunion wages in such cases" (52); and (d) Pox urged, and the Company 
agreed, to breed dairy and other cattle for sale to settlers. Although
not all Pox's recommendations wet-e fully implemented by the time the Privy 
Council gave its ruling on land ownership in 1918, by the close of Company rule, 
apart from owning extensive ranches, the Company had planted 62,000 citrus trees
10
at its Mazoe Estate, 11,000 at Premier and 8,000 at Sinoia, had built 
irrigation works at all three estates and had started to sell small irrigable 
holdings on these estates to settler farmers for citrus culture (53).
On returning from one of his many visits to Rhodesia, Birchenough reported to 
fellow Directors and to the shareholders in 1912 cf the great progress being 
made in settler agriculture. Unashamedly Birchenough succinctly stated the 
economic considerations that lay behind the Company's agressive white 
agriculture policy:
When we started Land Settlement (for the most part) we were 
selling prairie land to prairie farmers who applied to it 
prairie methods, and the land was in fact only worth prairie 
prices to those who bought it. Now that people know the 
land can be made to yeild a greater variety of crops and in 
larger quantities than they thought, and that settlers Can 
be put at once in.the way of raising such crops partly by 
the success.ful example of their neighbours and partly with 
the advice and assistance of a first rate Agricultural 
Department, they are ready and willing to pay higher prices 
for land, for the simple reason that it is worth more to 
them ... The sures>t way in my opinion to increase the value 
of our great asset - the land of both Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia - is to encourage and stimulate good farming. If 
we do that the price of land will rise automatically and 
settlers will more and more seek us instead of our seeking 
them. (54)
It is largely in the light of the above policies that the Gompany's involve­
ment in agricultural production and in the promotion of settler agriculture 
in Southern Rhodesia can be properly understood. However, it is important to 
remember that the above policies were given added impetus by increasing settler 
demands for a vigorous settlement policy. As Fox, Birchenough and other 
Company officials reported, settlers were constantly complaining that industry 
was languishing and that the cost of living was excessive "and rightly attribute 
these evils to the scanty number of the European population". ( 55) The Company's 
decision in 1907 to separate its administrative and commercial functions as 
from 1908 gave added impetus to the controversy over land ownership, a 
controversy that was to influence Company-settler relations until the ruling of 
the Privy Council in 1918> that the unalienated land neither belonged to the 
Company, the settlers nor to the African people, but to the Crown (56).
Settler representatives complained bitterly that monies from land sales and 
certain revenues (e.g. rents charged on Africans living on unalienated land and 
fines and rents from white landowners and tax on the mines) raised under the 
taxes and tariffs of the country were going into the Company's coffers instead 
of the development of the country. Thus in 1908 the 7 elected members forced 
a resolution through the Legislative Council, demanding that the Imperial 
Government adjudicate between the settlers and the Company
(3) with regard to the claim of the BSA Co to be the private 
owners of all unalienated land in S. Rhodesia;
(b) as to what imports or charges levied under the authority 
of Ordinances or Ather laws, constitute administrative 
revenue, and what expenditure should be charged against such 
revenue,
as, in the circumstances, the resolution stated, it was impossible for the 
Council to deal properly with the budgets submitted by the Administration ( 57)*
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It was in part in reaction to such settler agitation that Fox and Birchenough 
stress,ed the importance of time in the Company's realization of its land asset, 
lest the Imperial Government rule against the Company's claim, ^nce the 
recommendations that the Company itself go in for extensive agricultural 
production and promotion of settler agriculture.
State Aid and Settler Extraction of Surplus Value from Africans
The Company's policy towards land settlement was that settlers should be of 
the "right stamp", i.e. men with capital. C.D. Wise had recommended in 1906 
that the average settler should have at least £700. This amount included 
passage out, erection of temporary accommodation, furniture, implements, 
harness, stock, seed, wages, poultry, rent, food and £70 for extras (58). The 
Directors reported in 1908 that an increasing number of well-to-do persons 
were leaving the UK to settle in Southern Rhodesia. Statistics seemed to 
validate the Company's optimism; in I9O8 the Company's Estates Department 
placed 949 persons on the land, with an average capital per family of £800.
By 1913 the average capital per family had risen to Sl,240 (59)»
AA very important source of agricultural capital inflow was the ranching companies, 
which invested substantially in the cattle industry between 1910 and 1914*
A3 the Director of Agriculture reported in 1912, ranches "varying as a rule from
10.000 acres to 50,000 or thereabouts" were being developed all over the country, 
using African cattle as the foundation stock, supplemented in some cases by
grade stock from South Africa as well as pedigree stock from overseas (60).
A BSA Co shareholder who visited the country in 1910 reported that "There are 
a number of men who have made money at mining and are putting it into 
ranching". (60 Some companies such as Willoughby's had been involved in 
ranching almost from the time of Occupation, but in 1912 Dr, Nobbs was 
commenting on the "new feature ... that several companies have been formed 
during the year, and these and others are embarking upon operation on a large 
scale". The eight companies listed by ^obbs included Liebigs and the BSA Co 
i t s e lf .  All eight companies possessed at least several hundred thousand acres, 
while Liebigs, the Amalgamated Properties of Rhodesia and Willoughby's held 
well over a million acres each (62). By 1912 the BSA Co's Rhodesdale Ranch 
had been extended to over 1 million acres, and at 51*3* 1914 carried over
19.000 head of cattle. The 100,000 acre Tokwe Ranch was being used principally 
as a collecting depot and carried 4>914 head, while the Company's 3>590,000
acre Nuanetsi Ranch carried 4»524 head and the G0mpany intended to develop it 
"as rapidly as possible". By 19 2 O  Rhodesdale and Nuanetsi ranches, which by 
now covered 1,017,216 acres and 2,258,165 acres, respectively, carried a total 
of 88,487 head of cattle.
But the inflow of settler and finance capital was not enough. Most settlers 
on the land did not come from the monied classes in the UK. They came from 
South Africa, as was also probably true of ^enya during the immediate post- 
Anglo/Boer war period. The white population rose rapidly between 1904 (12,5969 
and 1911 (23,606), and especially during the period 1907-19H> and stood at 
53,620 b y  1921. Between 1904 and 1911 agricultural production more than doubled, 
involving 879 white males in the earlier year and 2,067 in the latter one. 
hrthermore, the agricultural proportion of the total white population increased 
at a higher rate than any other occupational class among whites (63). By 
1911 o n ly  8'jo of the farming population of Southern Rhodesia had come directly
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from the UK, and. in 1913 nearly 95l/'c of the white farmers had come from South 
Africa (64). The Company sought to stabilize the agricultural population by 
encouraging female settlers and by improving conditions of settler existence on 
the land through the provision of better communications with centres by road, 
telegraphs and telephones (65).
The Company's policy of keeping impecunious settlers out, expecially "low---
Dutch", was never pursued with vigour, as the continued growth of the Afrikaner 
"Republic of Enkeldoorn" clearly demonstrates (66). There were thus a large 
number of settler farmers throughout the period of Company rule with insufficient 
capital to farm on a large scale under Rhodesian conditions. Thus both settler 
farmers and the land companies were involved in Marx's "so-called primitive 
Accumulation" (67) of capital through the exploitation of African land, cattle, 
labour ahd the extraction of capital through rents under what Arrighi has 
termed semi-feudal relations of production (68). However, since settler 
agriculture in Southern Rhodesia hardly has what can be called "a peasant 
history", it seems to me more correct to see primitive accumulation not as a 
point of departure for the capitalist mode of production, as Marx correctly 
observed in the case of Europe, but as occurring (almost?) simultaneously with 
capitalist agricultural development. This becomes apparent when the orucial 
role of the state in the development of settler capitalist agriculture in 
Southern' Rhodesia is examined.
Primitive capital accumulation in Southern Rhodesia went on throughout the 
period of Company rule in varying degrees. The period was characterized by the 
violent struggle of the growing capitalism against African subsistence and 
incipient peasant producers. Repressive legislation ranging from Pass Laws, 
the PLO, to the Native labour Contracts Legislation Ordinance was enacted to 
facilitate settler exploitation of African labour. Roder has observed that?
The moment a man pegged his farm, he regarded the African 
villagers on it as his serfs, who would have to work for 
him. The chief means of mobilising this pool of labour 
in the first years was the s.jambok or hippo-hide whip, and 
after 1908 labour agreements which committed tenants to 
work several months, usually three, for the privilege of 
remaining on their ancestral land. (69)
N ot only did the state make agreements with other colonial states in the sub­
continent to facilitate recruitment of labour, but in-period*of severe labour 
shortage, settler farmers were able to flex their political muscles and force 
the Company Government to institute measures designed to procure labour more 
quickly than the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau could (70). Thus, in September 
1911, settler farmers held a mass demonstration in Salisbury and passed, inter 
alia, a resolution demanding the Government "to supply at once a minimum number 
of boys, sufficient to relieve temporarily an unprecedented crisis which 
otherwise will prove the ruin of the whole of the farming community" (7 1). The 
Government responded positively by instructing Native Commissioners "to place 
the position before their Chiefs" (72), which meant using Chiefs to force "their" 
subjects into contract labour on settler farms.
Apart from exploiting African labour and land, settler farmers, land companies 
and the BSA Co itself benefitted from unfair ;terms of exchange in the cattle 
trade. In January 1908, for example, the Comany's Marandellas farm bought 
cattle from Africans in the Umtali district for between £1.10s. and £6.5s. per 
head at a time when cross-breds bought from settlers were going for an average
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of £19 per head. (75)
Droughts were not without some benefit to white cattle owners. For example, 
following a severe drought in the Central and Southern districts in 1912, the 
state, which was largely being paid in cattle in return for the grain life had 
distributed among Africans in the affected areas, was able to re-sell this 
cattle to white farmers and ranching companies at very advantageous prices..
Thus the Administrator could joyfully inform the Legislative Council in 1912 that
It is satisfactory to be able to state that in almost every 
case it was found that the natives were in a position to 
purchase what they required, and it is anticipated that the 
cost of the relief supplies will be almost, if not entirely, 
met by the receipts, (74)
In 1915 the Director of Agriculture estimated that 20,000 cattle, mainly from 
the South Eastern district, had been purchased by whites. (75)
Settler farmers and land companies also charged their African tenants .rents, 
grazing and dipping fees, etc., which, the CNC tiJaA'TD fy\ 1926, were so
exhorbitant that "within a few years /they went7- far towards paying the purchase 
price of the farm". In 190^ and 1910, for example, the BSA Co's Lands 
Department collected £13,655 and £55>-422 revenue, respectively. African rents, 
which were not included in the above figures, amounted to £9,863 and £9,516, 
respectively, for the two financial years, "The small decrease in native rents", 
the Commercial Representative explained in 1911, "was due to the fact that on 
a sale of land taking place the rents pass to the purchaser." (76)
Speeches, of j-wo "liberal" members of the Legislative Council in 1923 
indicate clearly the manner in which the Compulsory Dipping Ordinance (1914) 
and the Cattle Cleansing Ordinance (1918) were being used by capitalist land- 
owners and farmers to extract capital from Africans. The first, McClery, 
complained that, "In the Karandellas district alone there are 27,000 head of 
: native cattle, and dipping fees a f 4-;»4<l. per annum (per beast) represented a 
sum of £4,500 that these natives were asked to supply. That was a high figure 
of 4*4d., but in conversation with the Native Commissioner at Marandellas he 
had been assured that it could be done at Is.6d . or even Is. per head, and the 
sum was so large as to make ..the position intcltkoMsix ^  (77)
The second "liberal", Moffat, raised a similar complaint; it was Africans on 
unalienated land and private farms who suffered most from high dipping charges:
According to the CNC1s report there were outside the reserves
279,000 /African-owned/ cattle being regularly dipped in 
private tanks. The standard price throughout the country was 
Id. per head dipped, ’which worked out at over 4s. a year ... 
continuing he /Moffat/ said that on the native reserves the 
dipping was done by the Native Department, and the natives- 
only paid the actual cost, which was something like one 
farthing ... In the Owanda district a man who controlled a 
great deal of land told him that he estimated the natives, in 
the district Last year /±922; paid £10,000 in dipping fees. (78)
The CNC summed it all up in 1922: "With a beast worth little more than a sheep, 
and dipping fees running into as much as Id. per week per beast, or 4s.4cL. per 
year, it would in many instances be an economy for natives, to be rid of their 
cattle by any means rather than keep them." (79)
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In the financial years 1904-5 and. 1905-6, for example, Native tax, fees and 
fines formed the largest single source of state revenue, totaling £176,000 
and £189,577, respectively. But during the above two financial years, 
expenditure on the Native Department was only £55*800 and £45*896, respectively. 
In 1909-10, African taxes and fees totaled £209, 425 hut expenditure of the 
Native Department for the same period was only £52,640. At the end of Company 
rule African taxes, fees and fines stood at about £520,000 (excluding contri­
bution to state revenue through customs duties), but expenditure of the 
Native Department stood at a dismal £120,150 (80). The above pattern of 
African sources of state revenue and expenditure of the Native Department was 
characteristic of the whole period under discussion.
Through its., control of finance, the Company Government diverted funds from 
African taxation to settler agriculture in the form of experimental stations/ 
farms, technical and scientific provision and advice, loans for fencing, 
purchase of grade and pedigree stock, the construction of dipping tanks, etc.
A speech by a member of the Legislative Council who had particularly 
paternalistic attitudes towards Africans, Hadfield, indicates the extent of 
state extraction of capital;from Africans;
Mr Hadfield said he wished rather to challenge the remarks 
of the Hon. Member for Salsibury district. He noticed that 
the Hon. Member for Salisbury district apparently assumed 
what the Hon. Member for Hartley had directly asserted, 
that the bulk of the money /paid by Africans./ was spent on 
the native. The sum of £260,000 was by no means all that 
was paid in taxes. They had £17,000 for the dog tax. Then 
there were the fines by natives into court and there was 
the revenue from prison labour, which was of very 
considerable value to the country; the item for prison 
labour, if it did not appear in the Estimates, should appear, 
because it was actually money paid by private individuals 
and by companies for the use of prison labour. Another item 
was the Customs duty ... He questioned the right of the 
Hon. Member for Hartley to submit that fully half of the 
Police Vote was spent on the native, because, if spent on 
the native, it was, spent in a double way, very often 
protecting the white man. If, for the sake of argument, one 
said the native put up about £500,000, there was still a 
very considerable credit to the balance of the white 
population and he believed that they had had the benefit of 
it. (81)
The African contribution to state coffers, and therefore indirectly to settler 
agriculture, was succinctly noted by the Acting Controller of Customs and 
Excise in 1918:
... I do not think that the public realises sufficiently 
what a valuable asset the native in this country is to 
the Customs revenue. Y/hen it is born in mind, for 
instance, that for each foreign blanket purchased by the 
native he pays indirectly in respect of Customs duty a 
quarter of the home cost, and in the case of a British 
blanket a fifth, some idea may perhaps be gathered as 
to the result native purchase has on the revenue of this 
country. (82)
Since, as Government publications often reminded in-coming settlers, African
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labour was "the basis of the economic fabric" (8j) and even by the close of 
Company rule was being paid only 10s. to £1 in cash per month, plus rations 
(costing about 7/6 per month) (84), in agriculture, and the settler farmer 
tended "to become purely an overseer" (85), the African contribution to settler 
and state capital accumulation went well beyond the payment of taxes, fees, 
fines, customs duties and the provision of prison labour.
At the end of Company rule in 1925, Southern Rhodesia's white population had 
grown to 56,185; settler maize production had surpassed one and a half million 
(200 lb) bags, and the country had become a net exporter of maize 5 the tobacco 
industry, which had suffered a market cirsis between 1914 and 1918, had 
recovered from the 1914 low figure of 426,425 lbs and had surpassed the 1915- 
1914 record harvest of just over 5 million lbs, to 5,878,460 lbs in the 1925- 
24 season (86). Citrus export (mainly from the Company's estates), which 
started in a small way with 1,554 boxes during 1916, had risen to 52,961 boxes 
by 1924 (87). The number of cattle belonging to settler farmers and land 
companieswhioh was estimated at only 110,000 in 1910 (when African-owned 
oattle were officially put at "not less than 261,000"), had risen to about half 
of the country’s estimated 2 million cattle by the end of 1925* Cattle exports 
to the Rand (and, to a limited extent, to the Congo and i/lozambique) started in 
1916, with 12,815 oattle, rose to 57,285 in 1920, fell to 12,408 in the 1921 
slump, but by the end of 1925 had risen again to 54,841 (88). In addition to 
building branch railway lines to such districts as mazoe, Sinoia and Victoria, 
the government had advanced grants to Road Councils to improve transport 
facilities.
The settlers had not simply ''carved fatms out of the bush" and reached the 
above high levels of production through individual genius and effort. As this 
paper has attempted to demonstrate, state aid in various forms to capitalist 
agriculture in Southern Rhodesia was crucial from the earliest days of its 
development. In 1?15 - o x  reminded fellow directors of the great competition 
Rhodesia was facing from the older colonies for settlers of the "right stamp", 
and stated that the country had to be satisfied with something less than the 
best, "and devote special attention ... to the working up of settler material.
It must therefore give inexperienced men of suitable qualities and dispositions, 
opportunities of establishing themselves upon the land". (89) Such a poliey 
has, in fact, characterized much of the history of white agriculture in Rhodesia.
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